After our discussion last class of
the moral and legal culpability of animals, I thought I would look back to The Trial of Renard. I found two passages there that I think could
shed light on the relationship between justice and guilt with respect to medieval
animal trials. Of course, it’s important
to note that Renard’s trial is conducted by anthropomorphized animals against
an anthropomorphized animals, and is not directly comparable to the trials of
pigs, rats, locusts, etc. held by real, institutional human courts. Nonetheless, some issues raised in Renard’s
trial are relevant to the real-life prosecution of non-human animals.
The first
passage is spoken by Pinte the hen, upon her arrival in court with the body of
her sister, who has been killed by Renard.
After explain the circumstances of her sister’s death, she bemoans,
“But
no force
Can bring justice to one who grins
At threats, and doesn’t care two pins
For anyone’s wrath.” (Trial of Renard, 102)
Can justice be done against someone (or something) who has
no fear of punishment or respect for authority?
Renard certainly understands the horrible things he’s doing, he just
doesn’t care. Pinte’s remarks suggest
that for her, force is not enough, that justice requires some notion of
repentance or guilt on the part of the perpetrator. This is a much more common-sense principle
when it comes to human criminals, but it may also have been applied to
offending animals. Joy Enders cites a
claim from Arthur Magnin that accused pigs would sometimes be tortured on the
rack, and “the cries which [the animals] uttered under torture were received as
confessions of guilt” (Enders). Peter
Dinzelbacher cites another example, a trial in Leiden, in which a dog who had
bitten a child “confessed without torture” and was executed.
What does
it mean for an animal to confess? Is
true understanding of the crime necessary for a confession to be valid? In the case of the pigs, it seems certain
that their squeals indicate intense pain rather than any understanding that
they’ve committed a crime, let alone a valid admission of guilt. It’s easier to understand a dog looking
“guilty,” but there’s still the question of whether they’re able to link their
punishment or scolding to a particular act of theirs. In absence of this understanding, can the
execution of the offending animal be considered justice?
The second passage is spoken by King
Noble, in response to Pinte’s complaint aginst Renard:
“I feel great sympathy with you,
And wish somehow to relieve your woe.
Renard shall come if he will or no!
By what you shall see with your own eyes,
Hear with you ears, you’ll realize
How truly justice has been done.
Vengeance I’ll have on anyone
For breaking the peace and murdering!” (Trial of Renard,
104)
Here, justice is equated with vengeance. What matters is not the state of mind of the
punished, but the fact that they are punished in the appropriate degree for
their deed. Bringing comfort to the
family of a victim is also a compelling reason for the trial and execution of
an animal, particularly one accused of murder.
Dinzelbacher proposes that one of the reasons for animal trials might
have been “comfort derived the ritual ‘magic’ of legal formalism, and public execution”
(Dinzelbacher, 421). For the animal
community in the story, trying and punishing Renard would be a way to represent
assert control over a dangerous individual who scorns authority. In a similar way for the family of a child
killed by a pig, the process of accusing, trying, and executing the pig might bring
some sort of satisfaction.
W. A.
W. A.
Bonus content: absurd-sounding
trials against non-human defendants are not yet a thing of the past http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Approximately_64,695_Pounds_of_Shark_Fins